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Introduction 
Investigations into Central Europe’s emerging party-state relationships have focused less on 
political corruption - the abuse of public office for private gain - and more on patronage and 
clientelism as political resources. But by Western Europe’s standards the majority of Central 
Europe’s FDI-dependent political economies have weakly rooted and organisationally 
fragmented parties and weakly regulated states on the one hand but strong business players 
on the other. The exchanges most vulnerable to particularistic behaviour are consequently 
between the political executive and business corporations rather than between parties and 
civil society (e.g. patronage as electoral resource) or parties and the state (e.g. patronage as a 
party-organisational resource). Privatisation, regulation, public procurement and EU 
subventions have offered governing and business elites extensive opportunities for 
corruption, and corporate state capture - the ‘highest point’ of corruption whereby private 
interests subvert legitimate channels of political influence and shape the rules of the 
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legislative and institutional game through private payments to public officials
1
 - is a defining 
feature of several new EU member states.  
 
This paper draws on the existing party-state scholarship but brings the business sector back in 
and proposes an ideal type to characterise the behaviour of political parties that preside over 
the continuous marketization of the state. A ‘corporate brokerage party’ directs its strategic 
focus to the private sector and acts primarily as a broker of the state’s power in the 
marketplace, whether expressed through privatisation, regulation or public procurement. 
Under corporate brokerage party governments, the party-state relationship is characterised by 
limited party patronage in terms of scope but this patronage is geared to control, most 
obviously at the top of the administrative hierarchy but also at the regional/local level, 
wherever business relationships arise. The prioritisation of those relationships is a 
normatively congruent position for governing parties in very liberal economies where the 
strategic, if not popular, consensus says the public interest is best served through a pro-
business and a minimised, ‘regulatory’ state. But absent effective regulation the systematic 
shift from consultative to commercial government, state and corporate contacts enables high 
rates of rent-seeking. Using the Czech Republic as a ‘crucial’ case for Central Europe, the 
evidence suggests that politicians able to direct allocation to the private sector with low 
regulatory constraints act less as honest brokers of the public interest, partisan constituency- 
or organisation-builders and more as corrupt private agents.  
 
Existing models of party-state development and the missing business dimension 
The evolving literatures on post-communist Central European party-state relations focused on 
the difficulties of shifting post-communist public administrations from political functions to 
greater policy-making capacities
2
, on the scale and character of party patronage and 
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clientelism,
3
 and above all on the causes of intra-regional variation in those trends:
4
 this last 
question addressed by a predominantly rationalist-institutionalist debate
 
which pivoted on 
how different qualities of party competition encouraged some party systems to exploit the 
state where others encouraged restraint. The main conclusion of this research is that the 
combination of post-communist state-building and party-formation provided ideal conditions 
for the renewal of party patronage as a valuable political resource, i.e. as a resource for 
primarily organisational purposes, not least party funding.  
 
But from the political patronage perspective, Central European conditions look comparatively 
unexceptional: based on the surveys by Kopecký et al (2012), Kopecký and Biezen
5
 conclude 
that no strong claim can be made for the growth of party patronage in any European state 
over the past two decades. In their 0-1.00 index of patronage applied to fifteen European 
democracies, the UK carries least patronage at 0.09, the European mean stands at 0.34, the 
Czech Republic sits squarely on that European mean at 0.34 and consequently ranks only 
marginally above Norway at 0.28, with Bulgaria only a little above at 0.42. Kopecký, Mair 
and Spirova account for the presence of the new democracies either at or slightly above the 
European mean by “the imperatives of party-building, and the need to counteract the 
nomenklatura legacies” of the previous regime.6  
 
There is strong evidence for a far livelier private market for political influence within Central 
European systems, however. As measured by the World Bank Governance Indicator “control 
of corruption”, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania have 
consistently fallen within the mid-50
th
 to mid-60
th
 percentiles globally (1996-2011), placing 
them not in the same cohort as Western Europe (with Nordic Europe holding consistently in 
the 90
th
 percentiles) but with South Africa, Brazil and Peru. The Czechs, moreover – the most 
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economically advanced of these lower performing new EU member states - have moved 
downwards from scores in the high 70
th
 percentiles in the mid-1990s to a plateau of low to 
mid-60
th
 scores by 2000, from which they have yet to rise. The business executive survey of 
the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 ranked the Czech 
Republic 117
th
 out of 148 states, just above Libya. The Republic was thus rated equal to 
Ukraine for the “diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or groups due to 
corruption,” placing it fifth worst out of twenty two post-communist states, behind Ukraine, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and the Slovak Republic.
7
  
 
Evidently political patronage, control of corruption and the corrupt diversion of public funds 
are not the same thing, the problem being how to make sense of how they may be linked and 
what this might tell us about the dominant dynamics of party and state development. 
Kitschelt noted recently how abstracted Central European party scholarship has been from 
political-economic understandings of power relations and urged new accounts to take more 
notice of the trajectories of economic and institutional transformation.
8
 Arguably it is the loss 
of this structuring political economic context from the party state debate, particularly after the 
completion of the initial transition that helps explain why the region’s political corruption has 
remained relatively under-theorised in comparative terms, despite compelling studies of 
individual cases.
9
   
 
Worsening corruption scores are actually common to all of Europe including the north-
western edge, historically the region’s leading political and economic frontier. And this 
confounds the majority of existing theories about the causes of corruption since these are 
typically founded in analyses of the developing world and developmental factors supposedly 
long-resolved in capitalist democracies.
10
 The rise in European political corruption being a 
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deepening trend, therefore, but more severe in Central Europe, the remainder of this section 
outlines structural shifts in political economic context and the dialogic, adaptive party 
response.  
 
The political economy of party systems change: the rise of corporate brokerage parties 
Through the 1960s and 70s in Western Europe, as modernisation, technological change and 
the successes of the welfare state transformed the social, occupational and religious basis of 
mass parties, increasingly ‘catch-all’ parties sought to widen their formerly ‘encapsulating’ 
ideological appeal. But the combination of oil shocks, inflation and de-industrialisation 
through the 1970s and 80s brought declining growth rates and a shift to neo-liberal 
orthodoxies in which governments increasingly traded unsustainable public debt for an 
acceptance of accumulating private debt. Whether next characterised as cartel parties,
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‘electoral professional’ parties12 or ‘modern cadre’ parties,13 Western European parties  
subsequently shifted to the privileging of the party in public office over the other dimensions 
of party organisation and identity as party governments sought to manage their increasingly 
constrained steerage over national political economies. In the face of declining membership 
and the growing instability of electoral support, parties sought agreements to guarantee state 
funding and privileged access to state media, and to moderate programmatic differences so as 
to stabilise competition between organisations now ‘socialised’ by long periods in 
government.
14
 By the 1980s and 90s a rising cohort of politicians no longer saw politics as a 
vocation but as a job in which they were less the representative agents of civil society than 
professional ‘agents of the state’.15 As voters retreated to their increasingly particularized 
spheres of interest political leaders withdrew into the closed world of the governing 
institutions: both were “cutting loose”, with negative consequences for democracy’s popular 
and constitutional components (Figure 1).
 16 
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Figure 1. Cartel/cadre/electoral professional parties in dis-embedded markets 
 
It was into this political economic context that Central Europe’s post-communist political 
parties surfaced. But these new political actors presided over capital-poor emerging markets 
and yet had everything to prove electorally. Where Katz and Mair sought to emphasise the 
rising dependency of Europe’s already ideationally diluted ‘catch-all’ parties on the state, 
therefore, Central European parties necessarily emerged as ‘instant’ catch all parties but with, 
if anything, intensified state dependencies. As Innes argued,
17
 for their first decade of 
development the challenges of dismantling the planned economy, reviving economic growth 
and preparing for EU entry meant the dominance of valence issues around which Central 
Europe’s political parties had to compete more in terms of their immediately credible modus 
operandi (populist, technocratic or nationalist) than programmatically.  
 
But there were important variations within this pattern of party evolution: Kitschelt et al 
18
 
characterised Communist regimes as having taken three forms: patrimonial (Romania, 
Bulgaria), national-accommodative (Hungary and Poland) and bureaucratic-authoritarian 
(Czechoslovakia). However, Innes showed that the legacies of patrimonial and bureaucratic-
                             
                             State 
Parties Civil Society   
 
 
Corporate Sector  
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authoritarian communism were similarly dysfunctional to the subsequent deepening of 
programmatic competition since the political elites emerging from both regime types were 
scarcely embedded in anything resembling identifiable social constituencies or ideological 
commitments, which left the resulting elites the most unconstrained by organisational or 
ideational forms of accountability. The significantly higher rates of anti-communist dissent 
under nationally accommodative communism proved more conducive to party-developing 
elites who both sought and were relatively constrained to add programmatic substance where 
possible. The latter more quickly resembled their professionalised contemporaries in Western 
Europe, but they faced even greater political-economic challenges. 
 
In electoral terms, both Central and Western Europe have shared an increasingly constrained 
arena for party competition within prevailing fiscal orthodoxies, and even more so following 
the 2008-financial crisis. Central Europe’s emerging markets, however, have experienced a 
radically concentrated version of Western European de-industrialisation, the same Single 
European Market constraints but also an intense region-wide tax competition to attract FDI,
19
 
among the lowest employment rates in Europe and a welfare burden arising from economic 
transition and aging populations in which human capital investments are relatively crowded 
out by pension and unemployment expenditures.
20
 Over the last ten years the electoral space 
for competition over economic issues in Central Europe has consequently narrowed to the 
point where the region’s most economically neo-liberal leftists – the Polish and Hungarian 
social democrats – have lost ground to parties of the populist right. 
 
Hence in matters of party organisation we can see multiple ways in which parties in the EU’s 
old and new member states have converged on increasingly ‘professionalised’ features, albeit 
arising from different developmental paths. Katz and Mair had already argued in the 1990s 
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that West European party membership was becoming largely symbolic: valued by political 
elites for its contribution to the legitimizing myth of a party over any informational or 
representational roles.
21
 More recently Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke have shown that not 
only are party memberships falling everywhere across Europe they are falling steepest in 
Central Europe, suggesting the region shares in the structural trends of rising voter de-
alignment over and above the expected collapse of Communist Party memberships. They 
regard those remaining more as “the outer ring of an extended political class” than as civil 
societal ‘delegations’: rendering them a negligible organisational resource.22 Across Europe, 
therefore, party work and campaigning are now necessarily capital intensive and contracted-
out to think tanks, professional PR agencies and media experts. As Kopecký, Mair and 
Spirova conclude, the relations between ordinary members and party elites are characterised 
by fragmentation: the relative independence of organisational layers (‘stratarchy’) and mutual 
autonomy.
23
 In sum: European parties across the board have become both more fiscally and 
programmatically constrained and more organisationally independent from voters than at any 
point since the creation of mass political parties. 
 
The characteristics of the corporate brokerage party  
But Europe’s political economies have taken another turn since the 1990s. Insofar as the 
business sector was present in the above-mentioned party types it was discrete: subsumed 
into the structural political economic context. Consequently these models need updating to 
capture the dramatic increase in direct interactions between governing political parties, the 
state and the corporate sector in the most deeply marketising of Europe’s political economies. 
Following Kitschelt’s insistence that party systemic adaptations are contingent on the 
changing political economy, the most significant shift across Europe over recent decades is in 
the drive to the ‘consolidation’ (liberalisation and privatisation) of fiscally pressured states 
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and the corresponding rise in directly commercial, rather than consultative, party-corporate 
relations and in the political power of business relative to other societal interests.  
 
Rational governments in modern market societies have long sought to incentivise business 
performance on the basis that corporate executives control investment and economic activity 
and hence the virtuous circles of growth, prosperity and rising living standards for which 
governments hope to be rewarded.
24
 But the neo-liberal turn has both intensified and altered 
the character of this structural dependency in several key respects. Driven by a long-term 
decline in economic growth in the OECD world
25
 Europe’s political elites since the 1980s 
have embarked on the state’s financial consolidation via the privatisation of enterprises but 
also increasingly, of welfare services and the ‘contracting out’ of administrative and ‘public’ 
service tasks. The result is intensifying interactions between socially dis-embedded political 
parties and corporations intent on capturing the relatively secure business of public goods 
provision. 
 
In an era of intensified global competition for investment, regulatory capitalism and fiscal 
consolidation, European political parties in the most radically liberalizing - that is 
corporatizing - states may be usefully understood as having entered a further stage of 
adaptive development towards a corporate brokerage mode whose overriding purpose is to 
serve the interests of business. What dictates the extent of this shift and whether it occurs in 
the public or the private interest logically depends on two basic dimensions: on the degree to 
which  governments adopt strategies of state marketisation (the frequency of party-corporate 
interactions) and the extent to which that process is regulated (the quality of party-corporate 
interactions). Those regulatory dimensions, particularly given weakened inner-party systems 
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of hierarchy and ideological constraint Europe-wide, necessarily include self-regulation, in 
the form of political elite values and their ethical standards, as well as institutional regulation.  
 
It is well established that Central Europe experienced significant variation in the value-
commitments of its new political elites and in those governing cadres who proved resilient 
over time.
26
 However, the significance of this vocational/ideational – and hence for our story 
self-regulatory and regulatory - factor for subsequent party-state development has tended to 
fall away from the rationalist-institutionalist-dominated discussion. But elite values are 
critically important to this story: Firstly, because political corruption is a personal decision. 
Secondly, because neither the distribution of economic assets nor the regulatory environment 
in Central Europe were inherited from an era of embedded liberalism but had to be built by 
the very political elites who found themselves in a collaborative relationship with the nascent 
business elite from the outset. The possibility of a vicious circle of low vocational 
commitment to the public interest, ‘insider’ privatisation, weak regulation of the developing 
corporate-political relationship and the systematic corruption of politics over time was thus 
peculiarly high. Variation in the quality of these factors necessarily influences the core 
characteristics of the political system: the integrity of political discourse, the quality of public 
policy making and the distribution of resources.  
 
By abandoning Communism Central European states initiated intense liberalisation. But the 
region’s transformation of property relations didn’t stop at the transitional essentials of 
market-making, as the fading corporate dimension in the party systems literatures implies. 
Along with Western Europe’s most liberal economies this region has seen a continuous 
reallocation of the state’s economic, administrative and welfare functions to the private sector 
but under conditions of significantly institutionally weaker parties, states and regulatory 
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provision. Through privatisation, access to government-backed banking credit, government 
contracts, tax and trade concessions, opportunities for arbitrage and more recently, public-
private partnerships and private finance initiatives, Central Europe’s governing parties have 
presided over increasingly porous business/state boundaries, providing politicians with a 
growing range of opportunities for direct relationships.  
 
In those – the majority – of Central European states that lacked vocational democratic elites 
to begin with, exceptional levels of elite discretion thus met with a succession of 
internationally encouraged political economic imperatives: to dismantle the state economic 
monopoly, privatise, encourage foreign investment, foster a domestic business sector and, 
under the rubric of the new public services management, to commercialise remaining state 
functions wherever possible. The result is an environment in which the continuous strategic 
prioritisation of business opportunity combines with no very obvious political elite incentives 
to regulate that process, even as it opens up unprecedented opportunities for rent-seeking, 
thus promoting both state and market failures. The irony of the prescription that states should 
improve their rational capacity by becoming more like firms, i.e. market actors,
27
 is that it 
encouraged an increase in directly exploitable relationships just at the point where the 
revenues from privatisation were running dry. 
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Civil Society   
 
 
 
 Corporate Sector  
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Figure 2. Corporate brokerage parties in neo-liberal regimes 
According to Kopecký and Biezen, the uses of party patronage are stable if not declining 
across Europe rather than increasing as, for example, the cartel party model would have 
anticipated.
28
 But the contention here is that the classic political science focus on changing 
party, state and civil society relations encourages an interpretation of stabilised rates that 
elides the political economic context: but in marketising states, control over corporate 
brokerage opportunities matters more than pervasion. There is not so much a gap in the 
literature as an unrealised invitation established by these scholars’ findings: their conclusions 
strongly suggest the possibility of either publicly corporatizing or privately entrepreneurial 
purposes for patronage, but this is left largely unexplored as beyond their focus. The thesis 
here is that European party elites in highly marketised states have become cartelised and 
network actors that now face outwards towards a relatively powerful business sector, as the 
outsourcing of patronage confirms. Given their comparatively low regulatory standards and 
still less socially embedded political party systems, the functions of ‘political’ patronage in 
Central Europe are more likely to be unmoored from the electoral and party-organisational 
purposes we conventionally associate with it.  
The ‘corporate brokerage party’ is an ideal type: an attempt to characterise a newly dominant 
modus operandi; it is not intended as an exact description of individual parties. The 
proposition is that in the era of regulatory capitalism parties in the most open liberal 
economies track beyond the ostensibly self-contained primacy of the party in public office to 
a form in which corporate brokerage is functionally dominant. In less institutionally robust 
environments the higher degrees of freedom around party-corporate relationships produce 
systematically higher rates of corruption. In such conditions the professionalization of 
political careers characteristic across Europe is likely to travel furthest towards monetised 
political entrepreneurship for private gain. By exploring the crucial case study of the Czech 
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Republic and placing the party-corporate relationship at the centre of the analysis, the aim is 
to test the empirical validity of the weakly regulated version of the corporate brokerage 
model.  
 
The Czech Republic: corporate state capture in an open society. 
The Czech Republic has been chosen as a confirmatory (least likely) crucial case. Gerring, 
following Popper, argues that “confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky 
predictions; that is to say if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have 
expected an event that was incompatible with the theory – an event which would have refuted 
the theory”.29 The general view of the transitions literature was that systemic corporate state 
capture was an issue for the former Soviet Union rather than for the prospective EU member 
states. Subsequently O’Dwyer’s Runaway State Building (RSB) registered the Czech state as 
among the most Weberian in the region and argued that this resulted from the Republic’s 
high party system institutionalisation, understood as low levels of fractionalisation and 
electoral volatility, limited party turnover, a relatively high degree of “closure” to new 
entrants and in most cases, bi-polar competition. Institutionalisation was what made a party 
system “responsible.”30 But this reading neglects the collusive realities of Czech party 
politics, the political elites’ collective refusal to professionalise the state administration or to 
curb corruption. Kopecký also shows that the level of vertical accountability within Czech 
parties is negligible, rendering their ‘institutionalisation’ formal.31  
 
Grzymała-Busse’s Rebuilding Leviathan32 was more critical of Czech party-state 
developments because it still considered robust competition the key to state-building but 
defined it differently. Leviathan argued that clear, critical and monitoring party competition 
and plausible governing alternatives motivated rational actors to take the state out of the 
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political game, since the credible threat of their imminent replacement made this prudent. The 
founding flaw of the Czech, Slovak, Latvian and Bulgarian systems was that they had 
embarked on transition semi-formed in terms of political competition. The resulting 
dominance of single parties meant less state reform and explained their higher levels of state 
exploitation. The difficulty with Leviathan is that its focus on party competition and funding 
cannot capture the ongoing political economic transformation of the state and the widening 
opportunities for individual – predatory - gain. Leviathan demonstrates that the unwillingness 
of less competitive party systems to build Weberian states allowed parties to opportunistically 
exploit the state to secure their own survival. But I argue, in addition, that the refusal of 
regulation under the guise of neo-liberalism (Czech Republic) or more clandestine forms of 
de-institutionalisation (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and more erratically, in Slovakia) 
combines with the increasing corporatisation of states to enable the systematic 
commercialisation of politics for individual gain.  
 
It is also worth pausing to appreciate the discrete normative optimism in the existing 
rationalist-institutionalist literature, specifically, how many of its methodological 
assumptions are rooted in the post-war ‘Golden-Age’ of growth, an era long gone. These 
studies typically depend on assumptions about how, once a plurality of parties begins 
competition the mechanics of competitive polyarchy – variously defined - sustain the 
necessary incentives to take the state out of the political game. But even in 1956 Dahl insisted 
no set of representative institutions was sufficient to guarantee effective polyarchy: the social 
composition of a political system, the nature of the conflicts which divided citizens and the 
development of values and political cultures supportive of democratic practices were all 
equally vital determinants in practice.
33
 And even that rejoinder is now insufficient: Dahl’s 
diagnosis assumes a level of effective institutional connection between civil society and 
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political parties that proved contingent on Europe’s post-war economic performance and the 
production regimes that propelled it.  
 
The theoretically pluralist background to the rationalist-institutionalist literature suggests that 
Central Europe’s more corrupt cluster of states – Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, should 
have improved their state-building over time, the Czech Republic most of all. As an open 
society that experienced clear state-ness (after 1993), relatively functional administrative and 
fiscal legacies, low inequality, relatively high and uniformly distributed FDI
34
, the rise of a 
credible electoral opposition and international integration in NATO and the European Union, 
Czechs should have seen an increasingly robust party competition and hence an improving 
party-state relationship. As such the Czech case is the least likely, and hence the apt 
confirmatory case for this paper’s argument, which is that the chronically high political 
corruption rates in half of the EU’s new member states are caused by the low regulation form 
of corporate brokerage party systems development. This party form originates in low 
vocational commitment to the public interest among founding elites or the later crowding-out 
of more vocational party elites. What develops are parties in which individual ministers 
operate as notably independent actors, producing an unstable core of elites who cooperate 
insofar as cooperation sustains the development and maintenance of political-corporate 
network relationships. These networks are developed and maintained through successively: 
‘insider’ privatisation, weak regulation of the developing corporate-political relationship and 
marketization of the state’s administrative and welfare functions. An examination of the least 
likely case - within the inescapable constraints of studying the covert practices of corruption - 
should illuminate the larger class of cases. 
 
Vocational versus non vocational elites and emerging elite discourses of the state 
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To begin with the question of elite values and self-regulation: the partition of Czechoslovakia 
in 1992 had given Václav Klaus and Vladimir Mečiar, the charismatic leaders of the 
republics’ then strongly dominant parties, opportunity to shape the institutions of their two 
new states according to their respective priorities. The narrative of Klaus’s ODS - the 
dominant faction to emerge out of the revolutionary Czech Civic Forum and also heir to 
many of its resources - was neo-liberal and vehemently anti-regulatory. A parliamentary 
party with many technocrats of both Communist and non-Communist Party backgrounds, the 
electoral strategy of the ODS was to depend on Klaus’s highly charismatic style, specifically, 
his vision of a liberal, free market-embracing Czech society. Klaus’s decidedly vanguardist 
rhetoric appropriated the “scientific” culture of socialism and the “leading role of the party” 
claims of the past and remarketed them in liberal capitalist terms.  
 
The political implication of this rhetoric was that the economy and not institution-building 
was the engine from which all social transformation, including democratisation, would 
follow. In practice ODS-led governments opposed regulation across the board while 
deploying administrative discretion to enable an ‘insider’ privatisation process that 
systematically excluded foreigners.
35
 Five years into the process the most powerful 
beneficiaries of voucher and standard privatisation were barely regulated Investment 
Privatisation Funds (IPFs) and the state itself. The former frequently exercised venal control 
over enterprises while the state as of 1995 still retained 32.6 per cent of total assets as 
‘residual state holdings’: the National Property Fund assuming a dual role as administrator 
and privateer of state assets that was riven with conflicts of interest.
36
 These conflicts were 
replicated in banking. The emerging government policy of recapitalising and relieving banks 
of bad loan debt at tax-payers expense perpetuated the ability of banks to extend expensive 
loans to already indebted companies, a situation the Economist described as a “deadly 
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combination of mismanagement, orgiastic lending (often to the bank’s own shareholders) and 
more often than not, fraud”.37 The result, anatomised by Drahokoupil, was the emergence of a 
political-business power block built around the three activities of privatisation, provision of 
soft-credit and ownership concentration.
38
 
 
The Czech Republic’s first right-wing coalition had not only opposed new regulation but 
done much to destroy the regulatory frameworks established by the more dissident-influenced 
federal government, inadequate though they had been. The coalition had blocked legislation 
that would have provided for shareholder rights, investment fund regulation, laws on conflict 
of interest and disclosure requirements. In December 1993 it abolished the state prosecutor’s 
function of general supervision over the state administration and the possibilities of external 
audit were also minimised. In July 1993 a National Audit Office was established whose 
president and vice-president were both ODS appointments. The new NAO was stripped of its 
previous powers to audit where it chose, and now depended on initiatives from parliament, 
government or the president.
39
 The conventions were set, in other words, for non-regulation 
in the name of the market, and for the politicisation (or more prosaically, ministerial control) 
of the regulation that there was. 
  
The new Republic was a strongly secular state that lacked the depth of debate on values 
emanating from, say, Poland’s Catholic, labour union and wide-spectrum dissident heritage, 
and in partitioning
40
 the federation in 1992 Klaus had detached the Czech Republic from its 
remaining national question and from the value-contestation that that had entailed. What 
emerged as the central platform of Czech politics against which all other parties had to 
compete was consequently a secular nation-building philosophy framed in “combat-task” ant-
state, anti-regulatory, terms. This path, according to Klaus, was a return to the entrepreneurial 
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culture of the First Republic momentarily side-tracked by Communism, a path that the ODS 
would go on to defend against an exaggerated external threat, one incarnated at first as 
Slovak nationalism but latterly as the encroachments of a conspiratorial, bureaucratic 
European Union. Klaus’s neo-liberal narrative was consistently presented as the only valid 
democratic idea. Moreover, by the time the centre-left Czech Social Democratic Party had 
emerge as a credible opposition party – a reformation of the historical party that was 
increasingly attractive to the complex factions of disillusioned members of the Communist 
Party – their emphasis was on the material aspects of social cohesion and state provision.  
 
The systemic costs of non-regulation were first felt through 1996-7 when failures of 
economic restructuring and regulation induced a second recession and a series of large bank 
collapses – by 1997 non-performing loans accounted for over 25 per cent of Czech GDP, 
compared to less than 5 per cent in either Hungary of Poland
41
 – and this coincided with 
major party finance scandals. The heyday of the Klausian project was coming to an end: as 
Drahokoupil shows, by 1997 the material basis for predatory games of ownership 
concentration was largely exhausted. Shortly after Klaus was forced to stand down following 
the resignation of his own ministers, President Havel delivered a “State of the Union” address 
(9 December 1997) in which he lamented the corruption of Czech democracy and the self-
serving character of the Klaus administration’s anti-regulatory approach to development. By 
February 1998 the Civic Democratic Party, its coalition partner the Civic Democratic 
Alliance and the Social Democrats were all subject to police investigations for corruption in 
party finances and an interim technical administration under Josef Tošovský governed until 
early elections were organised for June 1998. But Klaus’s fortunes revived following an ODS 
electoral campaign predicting the demise of Czech democracy if that party were not to 
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receive a majority. As in 1992 and 1996, Klaus presented this election as the crossroads to 
democracy and represented the rising Social Democrats as intrinsically illegitimate players.
42
  
 
In this context the clearest electoral strategy for the Czech Social Democratic Party was one 
of “cleaning up the state” and their “Clean Hands” campaign of the 1998 election proved the 
tipping point in their popularity. However, lacking a parliamentary majority, the ČSSD was 
forced into an Opposition Agreement with the ODS under which the ČSSD were allowed to 
govern conditional on the ODS gaining the Speakership of Parliament, the Chairs of key 
committees and controlling positions in the public administration. According to the former 
Senate Vice Chairman, Edvard Outrata (Independent), the Agreement “divided all the most 
important jobs between parties while the ČSSD pretended to govern.” As such it 
“reintroduced the worst aspects of the Petka”: the group of five leaders of the main coalition 
parties in the 1930s who had colluded in entrenching their control of the state.
43
 The internal 
ČSSD story was that under Miloš Zeman’s leadership strategy of recruiting players from rival 
leftist groups the party had become prone to a factionalism in which the party’s more 
vocational figures were increasingly crowded out. The left-wing paper Pravo reported that 
ČSSD supporters were disillusioned by ‘unfulfilled promises’, ‘lack of direction’ and 
‘nepotism’ after only three months in government.44 Within a year the ‘Clean Hands’ 
campaign had been cancelled after members of both parties were found to have 
instrumentalised investigations for their own purposes.
45
 Those privatisers who wished to 
continue the predatory games of the Klausian period had shifted their attention to the 
Consolidation Agency and, as Zeman later admitted, found new backers within the Social 
Democratic government.
46
  
Their rhetoric notwithstanding, the ČSSD’s subsequently poor regulatory record, repeated 
scandals and obstruction of anti-corruption offices over successive governments shows that 
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both sides of the political aisle established personal networks with business and enabled 
corruption. Indeed, Stanislav Gross’s (2004-2005) government ended after just nine months 
after the Prime Minister himself appeared unable to account for his acquisition of a luxury 
apartment.
47
 Richard Falbr, former leader of the Confederation of Czech and Moravian 
Trades Unions (ČMKOS), ČSSD Senator turned MEP describes the Czech political system as 
having shifted from one of “basic artificiality” (given its weak social roots) in the early 1990s 
to one in which “corruption is the rule”. Interviewed in 2011 he concluded: “The number of 
actual Social Democrats in my party at this point is an absolute minimum”.48 
 
The changing political economy of the state and the non-partyness of political control 
Although fluctuating, Czech privatisation revenues continued to be sizeable up to 2005, when 
they still constituted over 3% of GDP, but their eventual decline was inevitable. In the face of 
continuing fiscal pressures, however, government interest could legitimately turn to the 
potential of public/private partnerships (PPP) in all their variety: the latest solution in 
advanced capitalist states to the deepening dilemmas of tightening government finances. The 
Czech Republic duly adopted a PPP policy through regulation 7/2004, with further acts 
regulating PPP issues: the Concession Act (139/2006) and the Public Procurement Act 
(137/2006), which updated the first public procurement act of 1995 and its sequel in 2004.  
 
The problem for analysts, however, is that while these partnerships are comparable in 
importance to privatisation they are less visible and harder to monitor. The partnership 
possibilities involved are complex and range across all types of long-term arrangements 
between public authorities and private institutions, including but not limited to concessions, 
build-operate-and transfer (BOT) schemes and varied forms such as Public Finance 
Initiatives (PFI) and Public Private Partnerships (PPP). These techniques exist in addition to 
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the simpler practices of outsourcing government work to private business, such as legal and 
accountancy firms. The extent to which these methods were likely to increase the efficiency 
of public services provision or to enable political corruption was contingent on the 
motivations and skill-sets of the politicians and public officials involved and the regulatory 
framework in which they operated. But the financial resources involved were quickly huge. 
 
Between 2004 and 2008 Czech spending on public procurement rose from 22. 65 billion 
Euros to 37.25 billion Euros: an exceptionally sharp increase by the standard of other EU 
member states. The number of purchasing authorities publishing tenders nearly tripled, from 
260 to 744 in just three years; the number of actual published tenders rising from 471 in 2004 
to 2,449 by 2007.
49
 By 2008 Czech general government procurement and state owned utilities 
procurement, as a percentage of GDP, was the second highest in the OECD (the Netherlands 
was first) at just over 25%, with just over 50% of that expenditure administered at the sub-
central government level.
50
 In 2007 and 2011 Czech general government procurement alone 
constituted a third of all government expenditure and ranked fourth highest in the OECD at 
15% of GDP (behind the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden).
51
 Thus, the extent to which 
Czech political elites became institutionally outward facing to the corporate sector and the 
financial resources involved increased significantly following privatisation. Privatisation, 
moreover, had been relatively centralised via the Czech National Property Fund, dissolved at 
the end of 2005, with the remaining agenda transferred to the Ministry of Finance. But that 
business arm of the state also remained significant. At the end of April 2008, the Ministry 
continued to exercise ownership rights and to administer stakes in 74 firms: the total value of 
these stakes amounting to more than 78.6 billion CZK. Out of this portfolio, four firms were 
strategic companies where the Ministry held controlling stakes (the percentage indicated in 
parentheses): the monopoly electricity producer (CEZ; 65.34%), the monopoly domestic and 
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international oil pipeline systems (Cepro and MERO; 100% each), and the national air carrier 
Czech Airlines (56.92 %). These firms all continue to carry substantial importance for the 
Czech economy.
52
 
 
The question that follows, therefore, is whether these developments simply constituted the 
legitimate new strategic partnerships of a fiscally pressured capitalist state or whether 
something less public spirited was afoot. And to answer this we need to examine how 
prudently designed, operated and regulated this new architecture of public spending has been. 
Having established the dominant neo-liberal, anti-regulatory discourse of the initial transition 
it is necessary to fill out the institutional picture that followed on, now sustained by all 
political sides.  
 
As Kopecký points out, while Czech political parties have been relatively weakly socially 
rooted, as indicated by modest party memberships, low levels of party attachment, low voter 
turnout etc., they have nevertheless managed to reinforce their institutional strength through 
numerous interventions over time including modifications to constitutional, electoral, 
parliamentary and other legal norms, all designed to shore up the privileges of the early 
established parties against latecomers: a decidedly less positive reading of party 
institutionalisation than O’Dwyer’s. What Kopecký’s expert and insider survey further 
concluded, however, is that “the dominant motivation for parties to engage in patronage 
practices is not their need to satisfy partisans and party supporters with jobs…but rather to 
control institutions that are seen as important in terms of policy creation, control, and 
implementation.” Thus “heads of important sections of ministries, such as those who make 
decisions concerning investments or strategic financial decisions” are likely to be replaced by 
politically sympathetic appointees; patronage is possible via the relevant minister in all non-
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departmental agencies and commissions (NDACs) “but in practice it happens only in 
strategically important agencies, such as the Czech Consolidation Agency, or the Medicines 
Commission”.  
 
According to Kopecký this top level patronage is technocratic and mainly used to “translate 
parties’ programmatic commitments to real policy outcomes …with parties as organisations 
playing no meaningful role in the coordination of appointments or in their recruitment for 
those appointments.”53 However, such technocratic functionalism would imply important 
corollaries: a concern to optimise the knowledge base and deepen the technocratic capacity of 
the state administration, for example, but as we shall see such reforms have been strenuously 
avoided. The focus of ostensibly political control is nevertheless consistent with a 
preoccupation with control over public procurement.  
 
What happened to Czech state reform? 
From the early 1990s onwards the ODS had justified the failure to professionalize the civil 
service as an anti-bureaucratic principle and had also undermined the limited reform efforts 
of the Social Democrats. Thus, until 2014, the administration remained based on the (un-
enforced) Labour Code of 1965: personnel management was decentralised and without 
central coordination; each ministry and other central state bodies, like the Czech National 
Bank, acted as de facto independent employers with the power to recruit, promote and 
dismiss their employees based on often discretionary internal working rules issued 
independently by each political/administrative authority.
54
 Without a new civil service law 
the status, conditions of service, educational requirements, obligations and rights of civil 
servants were neither comprehensively regulated nor guaranteed. This failure to 
professionalise the civil service was of critical importance in enabling non-transparent 
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network relationships given the increasing porosity of the state to private business interests, 
first through privatisation but latterly through outsourcing, public procurement and other 
partnership arrangements. 
 
The Social Democrats’ attempts to reform the civil service in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
serve to illustrate the isolation of its remaining vocational ministers. Already by the late 
1990s the only ČSSD minister committed to pushing through a reform bill was Vladimir 
Špidla, the new Minister for Labour and Social Affairs and a grassroots politician who had 
joined the party in 1990 but entered parliament in 1998: a popular technocrat on the (anti-
communist) left of his party but hopelessly weak in party faction terms. Špidla had presented 
a draft civil service law in June 2000 only for a cabinet discussion to be delayed until 
November. By December, intensifying EU criticism of the absence of reform drove Zeman to 
place Špidla’s bill before the Chamber of Deputies. As a minority government, however, the 
ČSSD needed more support and the ODS opposed it. One and a half years later the KDU-
ČSL eventually agreed to support a bill if there was a similar measure at the level of self-
governing regions (localism being their key platform), a proposal which postponed the 
central ‘Service Act’ while the acts on self-governing regions were prepared, through 2001. 
Act 218/2002 was eventually pushed through parliament in mid-March 2002 by one vote.
55
  
 
Act 218/2002 
“The Service Act” was finally adopted in May 2002. It was meant to be enforced from the 
beginning of 2004 and fully implemented by the end of 2007. But the bill was flawed and 
weakened further in the second reading thanks to 101 amendments. Among these was the 
deletion of the provision offering tenure to civil servants which Klaus opposed on the basis 
that the ODS was “against creating a specific class of people”.56 According to the EU/OECD 
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assessment of the Act, “Repetition and excessive detail are commonplace throughout the text 
to the point that at times it is very difficult to understand the real contents of the law…The 
Act has 254 articles and three annexes, which is quite an unusual length… [it] blurs the issues 
at stake and [is] an Act of poor quality which will be difficult to implement.”57 
 
Though faulty, the new law would have affected eighty thousand state administration 
employees, improved wages and required higher educational attainment. All-importantly the 
Service Act would have curtailed political appointments (the World Bank had criticised the 
exceptionally high rates of turnover within ministries, sometimes approaching 60% following 
each change of government). If implemented ministers would have appointed only their own 
deputies and spokesmen
58
 with the remainder passing to a professional hierarchy headed by 
an autonomous Director of the Civil Service. The implementation date of Act 218/2002 was 
not just repeatedly postponed, however, but eventually dropped. In November 2006 the 
Social Democrat government adopted a Resolution (Number 1232) returning the basic 
management of the civil service to the Ministry of Interior. In August 2007 the new ODS-led 
coalition postponed the Act again, to 2012, and then announced it would replace it, 
suggesting it would prepare a new law in which personnel decision-making was maintained 
in the hands of individual ministries.
59
 Three years into the last ODS-led coalition and the 
abandoned law remained without replacement by new proposals. Following a government 
crisis in June 2013 (over corruption) and early elections in October 2013, a new coalition of 
the Social Democrats, the new ‘anti-corruption’ centre-populist party ANO and the Christian 
Democrats proposed to amend the original Act 218/2002. But the bill, eventually approved in 
October 2014, retains the political leadership of the civil service in the form of a Deputy 
Minister for the Civil Service with powers of appointment. The EU warned that without 
further reform of appointments procedures and salary transparency EU funding for the Czech 
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operational programming would be suspended. President Zeman filed a complaint regarding 
the act to the Constitutional Court.
60
 
 
In the light of significantly increased interactions with the private sector and the technical 
difficulty of managing such contracts (a complexity that has led to their repeated failure in 
the UK and the condemnation of PPP and PFI as a poor value-for-money strategy by the 
UK’s Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee61), the refusal to de-politicise the civil 
service demonstrates a fundamental lack of interest in technical efficiency and fiscal 
integrity. This failure includes the non-regulation of revolving doors of public servants to the 
private sector and of conflicts of interest among general civil servants. It also leaves weakly 
framed and barely enforced financial disclosure rules for high level elected and appointed 
officials.
62
 The sustained outcome suggests an enabling administrative environment for the 
evolving corporate-political relationship that lacks basic regulatory constraints. 
 
A footnote on Špidla’s attempt is telling. According to the original Act 218/2002 certain 
clauses (article 254) were supposed to be implemented immediately, with Articles 11-14 
creating a General Directorate and General Director of the Civil Service. Instead of the 
independent General Directorate of the Civil Service, however, only a ‘Section’ was ever 
established, under Špidla, in June 2002, with sixty personnel in the Office of the 
Government.
63
 The Section’s role was to prepare documentation for the anticipated General 
Director but one was never appointed and despite three more years of Social Democratic 
government this non-appointment meant preparatory work “written straight for the shelf”.64 
The Section was changed in May 2005 to the Department of Human Resources Management 
and downsized to fourteen people. In 2002 Špidla had launched a public finance reform 
promising a 2% cut of the civil service every year; under the auspices of ČSSD Prime 
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Minister Paroubek, however, the Section of the Directorate General of the Civil Service was 
chosen as the Government Office’s ‘2%’. Špidla was nominated Czech European 
Commissioner in 2004. By the early 2000s the ČSSD’s more vocational elites had apparently 
been largely sidelined by corrupt practices, internal party network disputes and the growing 
dominance of formerly senior communists in the party’s top ranks.65  
 
Regulatory facades 
Could this elite opposition to civil service reform be interpreted as a neo-liberal approach to 
administration that eschews the bureaucratic conventions of a more statist age in favour of a 
flexible but regulated managerialism? If the regulatory codes that governed it were coherent 
or binding such an argument might be made. Unfortunately, the evidence for a duplicitous 
approach to regulation exists across the board. Because corruption is a major issue of public 
and media concern all political parties must be seen to address it and so they do, in endless 
initiatives, anti-corruption programmes and public decrials of the latest scandals afflicting 
ministers and their subordinates. If we examine the façade of regulation versus the practice, 
however, the discrepancies have been consistent. Czech governments have become adept at 
playing a double game in which multiple anti-corruption initiatives are launched and 
publicised at both the parliamentary and ministerial level because the leadership is safe in the 
knowledge that none of these projects will gain traction. Under the continuing rhetorical 
justification of liberal market development, for example, lobbying has remained unregulated 
under all administrations: the main force for reform has come from professional lobbyists 
wishing to distinguish themselves from the dominant, unofficial lobbies. But any bill that 
might make it to parliament with NGO and lobby group sponsorship seems doomed to fail: 
earlier attempts in 2009, promoted by Social Democrats, were voted down in the Senate by 
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the ODS. As of now there is no specific obligation for registration of lobbyists or for the 
reporting of contacts between lobbyists and public officials. 
 
At the ministry level the evidence suggests that regulations adopted in response to corruption 
scandals or required by international organisations were simply not-implemented. Back in 
1999, under Špidla’s influence and under growing pressure from the EU to improve state 
function, a Government Programme for Combating Corruption (PCC) was adopted on 17
th
 
February and re-adopted in more developed form again in 2001, 2002 and 2003. But it soon 
became clear that the PCC was so notionally implemented that many of the agencies with 
roles in the Programme had little knowledge of it.
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 By 2003, moreover, the EU/OECD 
sponsored organisation SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management), 
highlighted the following obstructions to clean government in the Czech Republic: a Czech 
Bribery Law that was broadly in line with EU standards but which was unsupervised and so 
ineffective; a ‘dormant’ Civil Service Act; a Conflict of Interest law dating from 1992 which 
applied to no-one below the level of Minister or Administrative Head of Department, for 
which there was little proof of compliance and which provided no sanctions for violations; a 
weak ‘general duty’ to avoid conflicts of interest stated in a broadly un-enforced Labour 
Code and a weakly developed and barely implemented Code of Ethics for public officials and 
elected officials; the absence of effective protection for whistle-blowers despite a legal 
obligation to report corruption.
67
  
 
SIGMA’s writ ran out with Czech EU membership in 2004, however, hands-off monitoring 
continued via the OECD’s working groups on its Governance Conventions. But as with the 
EU pre-accession period, Czech governments have proven willing to comply with soft 
measures such as publicising the existence of OECD Conventions and the country’s signatory 
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status, but unwilling to act on substance. The OECD’s 2009 report regrets that no action had 
been taken in the Czech Republic to introduce legal liability for foreign bribery despite 
requests to fulfil this legal cornerstone of the Convention dating back almost a decade. Czech 
authorities explained to an OECD investigative group in December 2007 that “experts from 
the Ministries of Justice and Interior were looking at the issues,” but when the OECD 
required more “convincing action” it was ignored.68 As of the time of writing the Republic 
has yet to record a single indictment for foreign bribery. EU efforts to encourage state 
capacity building in terms of regulatory impact assessments (RIA) and policy audit have also 
fallen on stony ground. The Czech Legislative Rules of Government introduced a RIA 
requirement in 1998 after strong EU encouragement but it only entered into force in January 
2008 under the technical government of Jan Fischer. But with the Department for Regulatory 
Reform based in the Ministry of Interior the RIA unit had no power to monitor or supervise 
other line ministries which have subsequently shown no interest in adopting the standards.
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With formal international obligations unfulfilled over many years it appears that the Czech 
political executive has developed a culture of sham compliance with formal rules or simple 
refusal to comply.  
 
Given the high frequency of political corruption and the limited progress made on the 
implementation of previous years’ anti-corruption strategies, the European Commission 
urged Czech governments to step up the fight in 2013. But again they proved willing to take 
only soft, non-legislative measures and made little progress on long-cycling legislative drafts 
to fill in the following regulatory holes: laws on the independence of the prosecution service, 
conflicts of interest, freedom of information, creation of specialised courts, regulation of 
lobbying, the Public Servants Act, financing of political parties, extension of the powers of 
the Supreme Audit Office, protection of whistleblowers and reform of parliamentary 
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immunity.
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 To take political party financing as an example: the Council of Europe’s Group 
of State Against Corruption (GRECO) evaluation report in 2011 singled out nine areas of 
concern in regard to the non-transparency of Czech party political funding, the most 
important of which was that the supervision mechanism, in the hands of parliamentarians 
themselves, was of a purely formal nature, and neither independent nor effective as a control 
mechanism. However, after several months of Ministry of Interior and Government activity 
in discussing a new draft law, the Government decided to maintain the status quo. The 
rejection of the draft bill duly prompted the initiation of an entirely new drafting process.
71
 In 
the meantime, party spending on elections has increased fourfold since 2002, in what 
Haughton characterises as a “largely permissive regulatory and financial environment”, with 
the ODS spending some 541 million crowns in 2010, against the Green Party’s (SZ) 16 
million.
72
  
 
The evidence suggests that the Republic’s weakly institutionalised political parties have 
legislated for an increasingly porous state/business sector boundary that enables them to 
behave as barely regulated brokerage agents between the state and the corporate sector. 
Absent value-based self-regulation, moreover, these fluid boundaries have enabled Czech 
political elites to instrumentalise government for essentially private ends. In such an 
environment, party survival becomes primarily a financial goal. 
 
Evidence for corporate state capture in the Czech Republic 
With no whistle-blowing protection law (but, as of 2012, an obligation to report corruption to 
management or to law enforcement bodies) it is difficult to publicise manipulation of the 
public procurement, grant subventions and policy making processes in the gift of the relevant 
ministers and subject to few forms of appeal. However, according to recent data compiled by 
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ZIndex at the Institute of Economics, Charles University, 80% of all public procurement 
contracts awarded by Czech ministries between 2006 -2010 were awarded without 
competition or “in private”. Some 67% of purchases occurred entirely outside of the Ministry 
of Information’s Public Procurement Information System (ISVZ) and a further 14% involved 
an identical number of candidates and winners, typically, one. Only the Ministry of Finance 
had more than 50% of its contracts going through nominally traceable channels (52%) and as 
the purse-holder to the other ministries this, post-privatisation, is unsurprising. Every other 
ministry, however, showed less than 30% of their procurement going through traceable 
channels and the Ministries of Defence, Local Development and Justice managed only 17%, 
14% and 11% of transparent contracts respectively. The value of contracts awarded through 
these opaque channels is estimated at 276 billion crowns or roughly one-fifth of the current 
national debt.
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These findings are confirmed by both internal audit mechanisms and by public, most notably, 
business opinion. The Office for the Protection of Competition (UOHS) reported in 2012 that 
the most common irregularities concerned discriminatory and non-transparent conditions for 
bidders in public procurement contracts.
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 Moreover, according to the 2013 Eurobarometer 
business survey, fully 77% of respondents considered that corruption is widespread in public 
procurement at the national level and 67% in tenders managed locally.
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 In the 2013 
Eurobarometer business survey, 71% of Czech respondents – the highest percentage in the 
EU – considered corruption a major obstacle to doing business, while 69% considered 
patronage and nepotism a similar impediment, again, the highest number in the EU
76
. 
 
In its annual reports, the Czech Security Information Service repeatedly raised concerns 
related to public procurement, highlighting undue influence and conflicts of interests in 
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multiple sectors. The CSIS emphasised that these practices were based on informal, 
clientelistic structures undermining to the public authorities.
77
 Moreover, in an echo of the 
fate of both state reform and party finance reform, the Czech Republic introduced an 
ostensibly far more robust procurement act in 2012, only for this to be watered down by an 
amendment adopted in 2013 which removed those provisions in the 2012 Act aimed at 
increasing transparency.
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When it comes to the use of EU funds, the Czech Republic had been allocated some 26.7 
billion Euros in structural funds for the 2007-2013 programming period. But in 2011 the 
Commission discovered systemic failures in the Czech Management and Control System for 
the implementation of all fourteen European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund 
programmes. The Commission duly interrupted payments for all operational programmes in 
March 2012 and required an action plan to amend the lack of independence of delegated audit 
bodies, the function of the audit authority, the national system for handling irregularities, 
management verifications and administrative capacity. Although the Republic appeared to 
have fulfilled most of the Action Plan requirements, payments were once again stopped fully 
or partially for another six operational programmes in March 2013, the issues cited being 
weaknesses in public administration, in the legislation dealing with conflicts of interest, lack 
of transparency in the ownership of participating companies and the bypassing of public 
procurement legislation.
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Conclusions 
Director of Czech Transparency International David Ondráčka concurs that it is no 
exaggeration to speak of the privatisation of the Czech party system. The brokerage of private 
business interests dominates all the main political parties both from the top down and the 
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bottom up since the limited membership of political parties makes their local entrepreneurial 
takeover easy.
80
 The intensification of this process over the last ten years – the period in 
which the Republic’s control of corruption rankings have deteriorated – is in lock step with 
the significant increase in the legalised permeability of the Czech state to the private sector at 
all levels. The shrinking market for privatisation apparently encouraged political elites to turn 
to wider and more continuously available state-based opportunities: public procurement, 
control of the remaining public utilities, the contracting out of public services and EU funds 
etc. According to Ondráčka it has consequently ceased to be appropriate to look for inner 
party democracy or ideological commitment in Czech political parties as party structures 
have become vehicles for vote buying, patronage and manipulation, primarily in the services 
of building and maintaining private corporate brokerage networks.  
 
Programmatic competition and differentiation in public policy continue because successful 
competition remains essential to gain and regain entry into government. But Czech 
government has become primarily a financial market for networked individuals who use 
parties as vehicles for private gain, even as they continue to make public policy: politicians 
engaged in these levels of rent-seeking cannot be understood as acting primarily as ethical 
partisans. As Alexandr Vondra, Nčas’s Defence Minister and Deputy Chairman of the Civic 
Democratic Party (ODS) put it so unselfconsciously to the leading economic broadsheet: 
“Self- evidently business and politics work in a mutual relationship. But it’s not possible that 
politics would be governed by a single business project. That would be the end of politics” 81 
 
The ODS received their lowest ever electoral vote in the 2010 elections, the ČSSD their 
lowest since 1992, and two new parties, TOP 09 and Public Affairs (VV) broke through with 
26.7% of the vote. Some 38.5% of the 2010 electorate voted for parties formed in the 
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previous two years.
82
 A three-party coalition combining the ODS, TOP 09 and VV came to 
power in July 2010, only to confirm the deep institutionalisation of the corporate brokerage 
mode. Despite projecting themselves as ‘purifier parties’,83 TOP 09’s Finance, Agriculture, 
Defence ministers were quickly mired in corruption scandals. But more remarkably still, VV 
was exposed as an entrepreneurial front for a security firm, ABL, formerly owned by the 
Transport Minister, Vít Bárta, although ODS Prime Minister Petr Nečas admitted that Bárta 
had acted as de facto Interior Minister since 2010.
84
 The ascendance of Nečas to the 
premiership, moreover, may be attributed to the fact that he did not head a brokerage network 
and was consequently the only leader on which factions could agree, leaving him 
demonstrably weak. In the lifetime of his government there were numerous instances of his 
promoting apt policy solutions only to find them shut down by ministers as they ran against 
vested interests, most notably in the case of pension reform. Nečas’s term was cut short when 
his chief of staff (and alleged lover) was arrested for bribing MPs and using military 
intelligence to spy on his wife:
85
 exceptionally, Nečas resigned.  
 
What can we conclude about this unregulated corporate brokerage party system? I would 
argue that the patterns of patronage-as-control uncovered by Kopecký were not primarily a 
technocratic response to the weakening of internal party ties because had that been the case 
the enforcement of regulatory frameworks and the professionalization of the civil service 
would have been essential corollaries. These patronage trends more evidently ensure network 
control over increasingly extensive procurement rights. Kopecký himself points out that the 
survey suggests more dubious motivations and he cites the political takeovers of the Czech 
Consolidation Agency, banks and insurances companies, and appointments to most of the 
energy regulators. But he concluded that it was hard to judge the scale of such activities. 
However, when we explore the radical widening of public-private investment and 
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outsourcing arrangements the functions of patronage-as-control take on a more systemic hue. 
And the quality of the regulatory framework becomes critical to the judgement of whether 
political elites have acted primarily for the party, the public or themselves. The consistent 
evasion of regulation, the chronically high frequency of personal bribery and corruption 
scandals, the enormous sums of public money involved and the fact that Klaus’s final act as 
outgoing President of the Republic in 2013 was to declare an amnesty that included the most 
notorious cases of fraud and embezzlement during his tenure, suggests the last. Andrej Babiš, 
the Republic’s second richest man and the leader of ANO successfully campaigned in 2013 
on the idea that the state should be run like a business and that government is a poor manager. 
Babiš has been Finance Minister since 2013 and so the question stands: if the Czech state is a 
business then who are its owners? And if governments are not to be its managers, what are 
political parties for? 
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